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A TRUST RECEIPT TRANSACTION: II
GEORGE W. BACONt
The Uaiiform Trust Receipts Act1
T HE trust receipt method of financing the importation of goods from
abroad spread with considerable rapidity due to the increase in
foreign trade after the turn of the century and, on the whole, was re-
garded with favor by the courts. Throughout the same period it was
also used to some extent in domestic trade. In the 1920's its advantages,
which have been indicated in the preceding instalment of this paper,
attracted attention in the field- of automobile finance as the growth of
the finance company method of carrying through the sale of cars to
dealers and then to purchasers went on apace. There then became dis-
cernible a disposition in the courts to look less approvingly upon the
transaction.2 Added to the conflicting decisions as to the nature of the
f Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. The preceding instalment of this article dealt with some of the common law phases
of the trust receipt transaction. (1936) 5 FoRnnmm L. REv. 17. The effect of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act upon transactions between stockbrokers and banks and between mem-
ber banks and Federal Reserve Banks will not be discussed in this papeo although the
Uniform Act covers trust receipt transactions involving commercial paper and other col-
lateral such as stocks and bonds. [§ 1 et seq., whe~ever the term "Instrument" Is used, N.
Y. PFas. PROP. LAw (1934) § 51 (5) et seq.]. The discussion hereafter will be limited to
transactions involving goods and documents of title representing goods, such as bills of
lading, warehouse receipts and dock warrants, in which the trust receipt is used as a method
of security financing.
The business operations in trust receipt financing are outlined in (1936) 5 FonuAMt L.
Rlv. 17 et seq., wherein a typical situation is described. A form of trust receipt Is set
out in that issue at p. 32, n69.
Some confusion is caused by the use of the term "trust receipts." Some digests classify
cases and airtides dealing with trust receipts under the heading of "Trusts" along with
cases and articles in which the trust of equity jurisprudence is involved. Although there
might be some aspects of the transaction that could be considered to be within the equity
doctrine (see id. at 27-29), the law relating to trust receipt transactions is a branch of the
commercial law and should be classified under Sales, Pledges and other titles dealing with
security transactions. The Uniform Act provides: "The use of the word 'trustee' herein
shall not be interpreted or construed to imply the existence of a trust or any right or
duty of a trustee in the sense of equity jurisprudence other than as provided by this article."
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 51 (14). See also, Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293
U. S. 328 (1934); 1 BOERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (1935) § 38.
2. "The majority of cases in which the validity of the unrecorded security interest was
tested up to 1929, held the financing agency's interest valid as against the dealer's credi-
tors or his trustee in bankruptcy, but invalid as against a bona fide purchaser from the
dealer in regular course of trade. Since 1930, the decisions have tended definitely to deny
validity even as against creditors. The courts show strong objections to the secrecy of the
financing agency's interest." Notations of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF C OIrUSSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND
PRoCEEDINGs (1933) 246.
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transaction-whether it was in essence a conditional sale, a chattel
mortgage, a mere bailment or none of these--came decisions that seized
upon the mere formal accident that the title got into the buyer before
it got into the bank as a reason for declaring it to be an unrecorded
chattel mortgage.3 Hence the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
with the purpose of securing uniformity within a state as well as among
the states and in order to adjust the conflicting interests of all parties
concerned with a measure of fairness toward all, fashioned and offered
to the legislatures the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.4
3. See preceding instalment of this article, (1936) 5 Forrmis L. Rlv. 17, 4042.
4. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act as adopted by the Legislature of New York became
law on May 12, 1934, effective July 1, 1934, and is to be found in the New York Peronal
Property Law, Sections 50-58-. The text of the Act, together with the Report of the
drafting committee to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
is printed in the Acceptance Bulletin of the American Acceptance Council. 16 Accm x,cE
BuLLETN (August, 1934) No. S. The bulletin also contains the notations of the com-
mission on the proposed Act.
The Act passed through numerous revisions before it was finally accepted by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The seventh tentative draft
was finally adopted by the Conference in 1933 with some changes. The evolution of the
Act may be followed through the annual Handbook of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings, annual volumes of the years 1925, 1926,
1927, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1933. Prof. Karl N. Llewellyn of Columbia University School of
Law was the draftsman of the Act.
The Legislature of New York made two changes in the text of the Uniform Act as
adopted by the National Conference by adding the words "or documents!' after the word
"instruments" in section 2 (1) (b) and in section 8 (1), after the word "instruments" in
both places where the latter word is used in that subdivision. N. Y. PEns. Pnop. Lxv,
(1934) §§ 52 (1) (b), 58 (1); see 9 Uho= LAws A. (Supp. 1935) 180-183; in fra p.
251; note 41 infra.
The Act has been adopted in Illinois. ILL. Rnv. STAT. (Cahill, 1935) §§ 13-34. An ex-
cellent article by Prof. George Bogert, the draftsman of the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act, appears in (1935) 3 U. or Cni. L. Rnv. 26, entitled "The Effect of the Trust Receipts
Act," with special reference to the Illinois Act which differs in some respects from the
Uniform Act.
The Act has also been adopted in Indiana (Laws 1935, c. 206), in Oregon (Laws, 1935,
c. 224), and in California, (Laws 1935, c. 716). The addition of the words "or documents"
as noted above was also made by the four states besides New York which have adopted
the Act. See note 40, infra.
Legislative notes upon the Act appear in (1934) 4 BRO0LYN L. Rv. 10D; (1935) 4
FoRnA.r L. Rnv. 108; (1934) 9 ST. Jonrs's L. REv. 254; (1934) 82 U. or PA. L. R-v.
270; (1934) 20 VA. L. RFv. 6S9.
Connecticut has adopted a statute regulating trust receipts which has some features in
common with the Uniform Act. Laws 1935, c. 230, Comi. Grin. STAT. (Supp. 1935) §
1574c. Ohio has had a statute regulating filing of trust receipts of "readily marketable
staples" since 1925. Onro GEx. CoDE (Page, 1931) § 8568. The filing providons of the
Uniform Act are based upon the Ohio experience under this statute. Report of the Com-
mittee on Uniform Trust Receipts Act, HA.'oDoo0 (1933) 243.
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act will hereafter be cited as "U.T.RA.," and the Hand-
books simply as "HA.nooDBoo.'
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When one first reads the Uniform Trust Receipts Act he may not feel
inspired to write a sonnet in its praise as did Keats upon first looking
into Chapman's Homer. The reader may indeed recoil in some dismay
from its intricate provisions. But let him pause and consider the com-
mon law distinctions that hampered and harried bankers and business
men who were trying to promote trade with a minimum of red tape and
expense. Let him consider the useful function that the transaction ful-
fils and that should be preserved. Let him sort out the interests of
financing agents, of buyers of raw materials for manufacturing con-
sumers' goods, of middlemen who distribute processed goods to retailers,
of innocent buyers without notice and finally of creditors, all of which
interests are to be provided for and adjusted according to merit. Let
him consider how to shut out from the benefits of the Act those who
will seek its cover for transactions that experience has dictated had
better be left to the existing law of pledges, of conditional sales and
chattel mortgages. Then let him read the Act again, with real attention,
keeping its objects in mind and he will be apt to reverse his first im-
pression. Complicated the Act is, and complicated it must be since it
deals with one of the most involved transactions of our commercial life.
It is always dangerous to attempt to restate the substance of any
statute and it is especially hazardous to attempt it with this one, which
is, perhaps, as difficult to analyze as any to be found upon the books.
But we have already rushed in where angels fear to tread, so an effort
will be made to analyze the Act with the hope that the student and
practitioner will be assisted in some small measure.
Transactions Which Are Excluded
It is the object of the Act to encourage and protect the trust receipt
method of financing the sale of goods in their journey from producer to
retailer. It is in this field of commerce that the transaction has been
proven over the course of fifty years to be well adapted to serve the
needs of business. On the other hand it is the object of the Act to
preserve with little change the established law of pledges, of conditional
sales, of chattel mortgages and of consignments for sale to the fields of
trade in which those transactions function best. These objects are ac-
complished by closely limiting the definition of a trust receipt transaction,
by an exact definition of the term "entruster" and by a declaration of
the purposes for which possession must be given to or left with the
"trustee." Three typical transactions which are thus excluded from the
Act follow as illustrations:
1. The Extremeline Auto Agency negotiates on deferred payment
terms the sale of a truck which it owns to the Corner Grocery Company,
intended by the latter for use in delivering groceries. The parties
[Vol. 5
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execute a document which is denominated a "trust receipt" and which
provides that possession is given to the Company "in trust", title to
remain with the Agency, and other phraseology common to trust re-
ceipts.' This is not a trust receipt transaction. It is not within the Act
for at least two reasons. The Agency is not an entruester because it is
in the business of selling goods for profit and as against the buyer it
had the general ownership at the outset of the transaction; it is not
merely financing the transaction as a third party.' In addition, posses-
sion is not given to the Company for any of the prescribed Purposes.
To constitute a valid trust receipt transaction possession of the goods
or of documents representing the goods must be given to the trustee for
the purpose of further trade in the goods or documents.7 Even if, at
the outset of the transaction, a finance company held title to the truck
as security for an advance which it had made to the manufacturer on
behalf of the Agency, thus being in the position of a lender, and the
"trust receipt" ran to the finance company as the title holder it would
still not be within the Act. Possession is not entrusted to the Grocery
Company for the purpose of selling the truck or otherwise dealing with
it in a manner preliminary to its sale. The transaction would be a condi-
tional sale under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.8
2. Mr. Micawber, in need of money as always, agrees to pledge his
Model T Ford to William Lender for a loan but wishes to retain posses-
sion. Under the impression that he can protect himself against the
numerous and rapacious creditors of Micawber by resorting to the Act,
Lender procures Micawber to sign an agreement which they entitle a
"trust receipt" and which recites that title is to be in Lender until
his advances are repaid, that he may cancel the "trust" and take
5. A form of trust receipt appears in the preceding instalment, (1936) S Fornmut L.
Ravy. 17, 32, n69.
6. "'Entruster' means the person who has or directly or by agent takes a security in-
terest in goods, documents or instruments under a trust receipt transaction, and any suc-
cessor in interest of such person. A person in the business of selling goods or instruments
for profit, who at the outset of the transaction has, as against the buyer, general property in
such goods or instruments, and who sells the same to the buyer on credit, retaining title
or other security interest under a purchase money mo*tgage or conditional sales contract
or otherwise, is excluded." U.T.R.A. § 1, N. Y. PEns. PRor. Lw (1934) § 51 (3).
7. "A transaction shall not be deemed a trust receipt transaction unless the possession of
the t:rustee thereunder is for a purpose substantially equivalent to any one of the following:
(a) in the case of goods, documents or instruments, for the purpose of selling or ev-
changing them, or of procuring their sale or exchange; or
(b) in the case of goods or documents, for the purpose of manufacturing or processing
the goods delivered or covered by the documents, with the purpose of ultimate sale, or for
the purpose of loading, unloading, storing, shipping, transshipping or otherwise dealing
with them in a manner preliminary to or necessary to their sale .... " U.T.R.A. § 2 (3),
N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAW (1934) § 52 (3).
8. Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 1, N. Y. PEans. PROP. LAw (1922) § 61.
1936]
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possession at any time, etc. Although Lender may be an entruster who
"takes a security interest in goods,"' ) which interest is "derived from the
trustee,"'" it is not within the Act because it is not a trust receipt trans-
action. The possession of Micawber is not for one of the defined pur-
poses." Even if Lender had authorized a sale the result still would
be the same as neither Lender nor any third person delivered to Micaw-
ber the goods in question and no documents of title were involved.
With one exception, which involves the use of documents of title and
which will be discussed later, 2 the Act requires a delivery by the en-
truster or a third person (such as a seller) of the goods or documents to
the trustee.3 The arrangement between Micawber and Lender should
be construed either as a chattel mortgage or an equitable pledge, prob-
ably the former. 4
3. The Smooth Silk Company forwards goods to Factor Brothers to
9. See note 6, supra.
10. "The security interest of the entruster may be derived from the trustee or from an-
other person, and by pledge or by transfer of title or otherwise." U.T.R.A. § 2 (1), N. Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 52 (1) (b) (ii).
11. See note 7, supra.
12. Infra p. 251.
13. "What constitutes trust receipt transaction and trust receipt. 1. A trust receipt
transaction within the meaning of this act is any transaction to which an entruster and a
trustee are parties, for one of the purposes set forth in Subsection 3, whereby
(a) The entruster or any third person delivers to the trustee goods, documents or instru-
ments in which the entruster (i) prior to the transaction has, or for new value (i1) by the
transaction acquires or (iii) as the result thereof is to acquire promptly, a security In-
terest ... ." U. T. R. A. § 2, N. Y. PEns. PROP. LAW (1934) § 52. (italics inserted.)
14. For a variation of the transaction which might possibly bring the parties within
the Act see note 45, infra and p. 268, infra. Certain pledges, under which possession Is
temporarily left with or given to the pledgor are entitled to a limited protection under the
Act and will be discussed later, infra p. 267.
A transaction analogous to the one above will be found in In re A. E. Fountain, Inc., 282
Fed. 816 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922). The dealer pledged to a bank, in return for a loan, 3000
dolls which he owned and had in stock and gave a writing in the form of a trust receipt
which contained a liberty of sale. "As a result of the transaction" the bank acquired a
security interest as a lender. Even so it would not be within the Act because the goods
were not delivered to the borrower by the entruster or any third person in bringing about
the purported trust receipt transaction. See note 13, supra. It is submitted that the
result in In re A. E. Fountain, Inc., supra would be the same today, i.e., it would be held
to be an unrecorded chattel mortgage and void as against the trustee in bankruptcy.
However, the case might possibly be considered a pledge and to fall under section 3 of the
Act in that the lender would be protected for ten days. See infra p. 268. N. Y. PRas.
PROP. LAW (1934) § 53. Apparently the facts of the Fountain case would constitute a
trust receipt transaction under a provision inserted in the Illinois statute. See Bogert,
supra note 4, at 28.
It should be noticed that two cases were discussed in the above cited opinion. The first
one concerned the dolls. The second one, In re Carl Dernberg & Sons, Inc., which was also
held on the facts before the court to be an unrecorded chattel mortgage would, however,
be a trust receipt transaction within the Act. See infra p. 247.
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be sold on commission by the latter at prices fixed by the Company, the
Brothers to account to the Company from time to time and being ex-
pected to return any unsold goods. The Brothers sign a document
containing much of the phraseology of the usual trust receipt. Although
the purpose of delivering possession to Factor Brothers is within the
terms of the Act it specifically excludes "transactions of bailment or
consignment in which the title of the bailor or consignor is not retained
to secure an indebtedness to him of the bailee or consignee."" Tests
that have been applied by the courts in order to distinguish between
conditional sales and bailments will be helpful here.1"
Ordinary chattel mortgages and true conditional sales therefore, even
though an effort is made to conceal them under the terminology of trust
receipts, are not entitled to the protection of the Act because (1) the
holder of the security interest is not an entruster, or because (2) he or
some third person did not deliver the goods or documents representing
them to the borrower or vendee, or because (3) the purpose of the bor-
rower's or vendee's possession is not that delimited. Consignments for
sale masquerading as trust receipt transactions are likewise excluded.
Transactions Clearly Included
It is hardly necessary to say that the common form of tripartite trust
receipt transaction which was upheld at common law is within the Act.
However, for the sake of completeness in analysis and because an in-
teresting point arises in connection with it, the case of Farmers Bank v.
Logan will be presented." There are four different types of cases which
are defined to be trust receipt transactions, of which that case repre-
sents one type. Always provided that the possession of the trustee is
for one of the purposes delimited"8 it is a trust receipt transaction if:
(A) " . . . the entruster or any third person delivers to the trustee
goods [or] documents... in which the entruster prior to the transaction
has... a security interest... !,19
In Farmers Bank v. Logan the seller in Buffalo shipped wheat by
canal boat destined for one Brown of New York. The seller took out
order bills of lading naming the Bank as consignee, the Bank having
discounted a draft drawn upon Brown. This put title in the Bank for
15. U.T.RA. § 15, N. Y. PEAs. PRoP. LAW (1934) § 58-g. Another reason whxy the Silk
Company case would not be a trust receipt transaction is because the Company would
not be an "entruster." See note 6, supra.
16. General Electric Co. v. Mfartin, 99 W. Va. 519, 130 S. E. 299 (1925), is a good
case containing a review of the authorities and reaching the conclusion that the transaction
before the court was a consignment.
17. Farmers & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568 (1878).
18. See note 7, supra.
19. U.T.R.A. § 2 (1) (a) (i), N. Y. Pans. PRoP. L.W (1934) § 52 (1) (a) (i).
19361
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its security. The papers were delivered to the Bank which then for-
warded them to its correspondent in New York City with a notice
stamped upon the bill of lading addressed to Brown stating that the
wheat was "pledged" to the Bank as security for payment of the draft
and that the wheat was put into his custody, in trust, for that purpose,
not to be diverted until the draft was paid. When it reached New York
City the bill of lading was delivered to Brown, who, of course, by accept-
ing it agreed to that stipulation. As between the Bank and Brown it
can be said the transaction was then concluded, hence it was a case in
which the entruster delivered documents to the trustee in which, prior
to the transaction, the entruster had a security interest. There seems
little question that, as required by the Act, the purpose of the transaction
was to enable Brown to unload and store the wheat "in a manner pre-
liminary to or necessary" to its saleY1
So far it seems to be a trust receipt transaction but it would not be
such under the Act because Brown did not "sign and deliver" a written
trust receipt or a written agreement to give such a receipt. 2 Under the
modern practice this would have been done, however, and the transaction
would then be within the Act. It is rather startling, nevertheless, to
discover that the leading case at common law of a valid tripartite trans-
action would not, on its exact facts, be within the Act.2
20. See preceding instalment, heading The Bank's Interest, (1936) 5 FoaRM=x L. REv.
17, 24.
21. U.T.RA. § 2 (3) (b), N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAv (1934) § 52 (3) (b), quoted in note
7, supra.
22. U.T.R.A. § 2 (1) (b) " . . . provided that the delivery [of goods or documents by
the entruster or a third person to the trustee] ...either (i) be against the signing and de-
livery by the trustee of a writing designating the goods, documents or instruments con-
cerned, and reciting'that a security interest therein remains in or will remain in, or has
passed to or will pass to, the entruster, or
(ii) be pursuant to a prior or concurrent written and signed agreement of the trustee to
give such a writing." N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 52 (1) (b). See also id, § 2;
U.T.R.A. § 4, N. Y. PIs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 54, quoted in note 36, infra.
23. The object of the sections cited in the note above is stated by the Commissioners
to be to protect the trustee "from alleged oral agreements limiting his rights." HANDDooX
(1933) 251. They will also simplify proof, of course. In the Farmers Bank case the bill
of lading will be on file in the carrier's office and can be procured, so both parties would,
in fact, be protected by written proof of their agreement. Hence it could be urged that,
bealing the objects of the statutory provision in mind, the transaction substantially com-
plied with the Act and that the technical absence of a trust receipt or of a written con-
tract to give one could be disregarded. But should a strict compliance with the Act be
required, then, on a like case today the Bank would be deprived of the protection of the
Act and the result of the case would be different on that ground alone. Banks or lenders
cannot, of course, increase their rights by resorting to the exact procedure in the Farmers
Bank case in the hope of avoiding limitations placed by the Act upon their rights as against
creditors and purchasers. Failure to comply with the Act, on the contrary, will deprive
the entruster as against third persons of even those rights conferred upon him by the Act,
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The subdivision of the Act quoted above includes not only the ortho-
dox tripartite transaction but also a bipartite transaction which would
not have been valid at common law in most jurisdictions. To illustrate:
Goods which he owns are pledged by a dealer in return for a loan and
possession is given to the pledgee. Subsequently the dealer obtains
redelivery against a written trust receipt in order to sell or exchange the
goods. In this instance goods, instead of documents, are delivered to
the trustee in which the entruster, prior to the transaction, had a security
interest and delivery was made for one of the designated purposes. 4
This appears to modify the common law of pledge in that, on these exact
facts, a pledgee out of possession (now an "entruster" under the Act) is
given an extended measure of protection against creditors and trustees
in bankruptcy,25 against subsequent pledgees of the same goods and
against purchasers who take the goods in satisfaction of debts owed by
the trustee.26 Purchasers in good faith and without actual notice, how-
ever, would take free of the entruster's interest just as at common law,
provided they bought the goods for cash or on credit, even though the
transaction was filed as provided by the Act.2 T
Security Interest Acquired by the Transaction
A second type of trust receipt transaction is provided for in order to
get over any difficulties that might exist under the case law if, by chance,
the title should happen to get into the trustee before the financing opera-
tions were completed and before he signed a trust receipt. In such a
case at common law the courts were inclined, or felt compelled, to de-
clare the transaction to be either a pledge invalid against creditors for
lack of possession in the pledgee or an unrecorded chattel mortgage.23
This type is one in which
(B) " . . . the entruster or any third person delivers to the trustee
goods, [or] documents ... in which the entruster ... for new value by
the transaction acquires ... a security interest .... ?" It will be ob-
served that this subdivision differs from (A) previously discussed in
24. See note 7, supra. See further U.T.R.A. § 14, N. Y. PEas. Pnop. L-,w (1934) § 58-f.
Professor Bogert gives a like illustration as within the Act. Bogert, supra note 4, at 28.
25. See heading Creditors of the Trustee, p. 262, infra.
26. See heading Purchasers not Buyers in the Ordinary Course, p. 260, infra.
27. See heading Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Trade, p. 255, infra.
At common law a pledgee's interest was not always lost if he returned poss-on to the
borrower for the purpose of sale, the "agent" to account for the proceeds. Kellogg v.
Thompson, 142 Mlass. 76, 6 N. E. 860 (1886).
28. See preceding instalment, (1936) 5 FoRDHA L. REv. 17, 40. For a case see People's
Nat. Bank v. Mulholland, 224 Mass. 448, 113 N. E. 365 (1916). On a rehearing of the
same case new facts appeared, changing the result, 228 Mlass. 152, 117 N. E. 46 (1917). Cf.
In re E. Reboulin Fils & Co., 165 Fed. 245 (D. N. J. 1903).
29. U.T.RA. § 2 (1) (a) (ii), N. Y. PEas. PRoP. Law (1934) § 52 (1) (a) (ii).
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that (1) new value must be given by the entruster at the time he ac-
quires his security interest and (2) that his interest is acquired by the
transaction and had not existed prior thereto. To illustrate:
The seller, filling an order from a buyer, ships goods under order bills
of lading in which the buyer is named as consignee. The effect of such
a shipment under the Uniform Sales Act is to put title in the buyer, but
by retaining the bills the seller reserves the right to possession as against
the buyer.30 The seller then draws a draft on the buyer for the price
and sends both the draft and the bills of lading through banks for
collection. " The banks acquire no interest in the goods, of course, as they
are acting merely as agents for the sole purpose of collecting the draft.
When the documents reach the buyer's city, however, he enters into a
trust receipt agreement with the collecting bank which advances the
funds to meet the purchase-money draft." In this event it is submitted
that the bank acquires its security interest "by the transaction" and for
new value.32 Possession being given to the buyer for the proper purposes
it is a trust receipt transaction.
The same :result might be reached in another way in which the party
financing the transaction would have no connection whatsoever with the
seller. Let it be supposed that in the case just described a finance
company intervenes by furnishing the money to meet the seller's draft,
simultaneously taking a trust receipt from the buyer who is put in
possession of the documents for the proper purposes. This also appears
to be a transaction in which a third person, the seller (by its agent the
bank), delivers documents to the trustee and by which the entruster, for
new value, acquires a security interest "by the transaction". In prac-
tice the bank would probably handle the whole matter in gross, calling
upon the finance company for the funds to meet the draft, remitting to
the seller and procuring the buyer to execute the trust receipt in favor
of the finance company as entruster3 3 Depending on the order of events
30. UNiFORm SALES Acr § 20 (3), N. Y. PEAs. PROP. LAW (1911) § 101 (3).
31. People's Nat. Bank v. Mulholland, 228 Mass. 152, 117 N. E. 46 (1917), was such a
case. Compare In re E. Reboulin Fils & Co., 165 Fed. 245 (D. N. J. 1908). This was
a case in which some bills of lading were drawn to the order of the buyer and some merely
"to order" and endorsed in blank by the shipper. However, all the bills were delivered
by the seller to the bank, which accepted drafts. It was there held that the bank acquired
title when the bills were delivered to it.
32. "'New value' includes new advances or loans made, or new obligations incurred, or
the release or surrender of a valid and existing security interest, or the release of a claim to
proceeds under Section 10; but 'new value' shall not be construed to include extension or
renewals of existing obligations of the trustee, nor obligations substituted for such existing
obligations." U.T.R.A. § 1, N. Y. Pans. PROP. LAW (1934) § 351 (7).
33. This was the method followed in In re James, Inc., 30 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d,
1929). In that case, however, it may be inferred from the facts that the bills of lading
were taken to the seller's order, hence title never passed to the buyer but passed directly
[Vol.,'
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such a case might be either one in which the interest of the financing
agent is acquired "by the transaction" or perhaps it might fall under
the next subdivision to be discussed; but in any event it would be clearly
within the Act.
Security Interest to be Acquired Promptly
The third type of transaction provided for is the one in which
(C) " . . . the entruster or any third person delivers to the trustee
goods [or] documents ... in which the entruster ... for new value ...
as a result [of the transaction] is to acquire promptly, a security in-
terest....,,34
This seems to be covered by the situation which would exist in the
case last considered if the finance company should furnish funds to the
collecting bank in order to meet the seller's draft a day or so before the
buyer executed the trust receipt. The writer believes it would also be
illustrated by cases like Moors v. Kidder.3 5 In that case a banker, on
August 3, furnished one Swain with a letter of credit against a writing
executed by Swain in which he agreed to pledge to the banker all the
property to be later purchased with the letter of credit. On the date
when the transaction was concluded no security interest passed to the
bank, of course, as no goods had yet been shipped or otherwise identified
as the subject matter of the pledge. But as soon as the letter of credit
was sent abroad and the seller shipped the goods a security interest was
to, and did, vest in the banker. Swain's written agreement would be
equivalent to giving a trust receipt under the terms of the Act;'- the
banker gave new value in that he incurred a new obligation by issuing
the letter of credit;r a pledge is included in the definition of security
from the seller to the finance company thus bringing it under (A), the firt type of trust
receipt transaction discussed above.
34. U.T.RA. § 2 (1) (a) (iii), N. Y. Pans. PRop. LAw (1934) § 52 (1) (a) (iii).
35. 106 N. Y. 32 (1887).
36. "Contract to give trust receipt. 1. A contract to give a trust receipt, if in vriting and
signed by the trustee, shall, with reference to goods, documents or instruments thereafter
delivered by the entruster to the trustee in reliance on such contract, be equivalent in all
respects to a trust receipt.
"2. Such a contract shall as to such goods, documents, or instruments be specifically en-
forceable against the trustee; but this subsection shall not enlarge the scope of the en-
truster's rights against creditors of the trustee as limited by this act.' U.T.R.A. § 4, N. Y.
PEns. PROP. LAw (1934) § 54.
37. U.T.RA. § 1, N. Y. Pans. PRop. LAw (1934) § 51 (definition of "New Value")
quoted in full, note 32, supra.
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interest"8 and the banker subsequently, in reliance on the contract, de-
livered to Swain the shipping documents representing the goods.8"
The Added Type of Transaction
The form of the Act as approved by the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws provided for the three types of transactions dis-
cussed as (A), (B), and (C). These three types comprised the only
ones involving goods or documents which were entitled to the full pro-
tection of the Act, although a limited protection was also accorded to
certain pledge arrangements which did not come within the definition
of a trust receipt transaction.40  These three types of transactions would
seem to provide for nearly every contingency that might arise calling
for the financing by a third person of the purchase of goods in the im-
38. "'Security interest' means a property interest in goods, documents or Instruments,
limited in extent to securing performance of some obligation of the trustee or of some third
person to the entruster, and includes the interest of a pledgee, and title, whether or not
expressed to be absolute, whenever such title is in substance taken or retained for security
only." U.T.R.A. § 1, N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 51 (12).
39. See note 36, supra. When the documents were delivered to Swain on Nov. 18 he
then signed a trust receipt. But it is submitted that under the Act the trust receipt trans-
action really took place on Aug. 3 and that the facts bring the case within the type of
transaction under discussion rather than under (A), the type first discussed.
It may be objected, however, that the -Banker did not acquire the security interest
promptly after the contract was signed; that the type of transaction provided for in (C)
is illustrated only by cases such as first suggested under that symbol, i.e., where the finance
company gave its new value a day or two before the trust receipt was executed by the
the retail dealer in automobiles. If that be so Moors v. Kidder, 106 N. Y. 32 (1887), could
still be put under (A) on the theory that the transaction was concluded on Nov. 18 wheh
Swain signed the trust receipt, the banker having acquired his security interest prior to
that time.
This discussion suggests another type of case: Assume that a bank issues an open letter
of credit by which it undertakes to finance imports of goods which may be made by Its
customer, X, at any time during the next five years, unless revoked. X signs a contract by
which he undertakes to execute trust receipts for each lot of goods as received. The ar-
rangement still being in effect in the fifth year, the seller ships a lot of goods under bills
of lading to the order of the banker and discounts a draft under the open letter of credit.
The bills are delivered to X but before he signs a trust receipt he files a petition In bank-
ruptcy. It would still, apparently, be a case contemplated by the policy of the Act but It
would not be under (A) as the security interest was not acquired prior to the transaction
(if the transaction be regarded as having taken place five years before when the agree-
ment was signed); it would not he under (B) as the security interest was not acquired by
the transaction, i.e., simultaneously therewith; nor would it be under (C), the security In-
terest not being acquired promptly as a result of the transaction. It is suggested, however,
that it would be covered by Section 4, quoted in full in note 36, supra. Section 4 would
not seem to be applicable, however, if the seller shipped the goods directly to the buyer by
making him consignee of the bills of lading which are then sent to him. Section 4 requires
the delivery to be made by the entruster and does not include a delivery by a third person
such as the seller, as does Section 2.
40. Infra, p. 267.
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mediate course of transfer from producer to wholesaler to retailer. It
was in that field of trade that experience had shown that the trust
receipt method of financing fulfilled a business need. It was in that
field of trade that freedom from the burdensome filing and foreclosure
requirements of conditional sales and chattel mortgages seemed de-
sirable.
A fourth type of transaction, however, has been provided by the
addition of the two words "(or documents" to one of the subdivisions of
the Uniform Act, an addition which has been made by every legislature
which has so far adopted it.4 ' The subdivision is as follows:
(D) ". . . the entruster gives new value in reliance upon the transfer
by the trustee to such entruster of a security interest in instruments ol
documents which are actually exhibited to such entruster, or to his agent
in that behalf, at a place of business of either entruster or agent, but
possession of which is retained by the trustee... ,42
No doubt it was believed that in adding the words "or documents",
thus including bills of lading and warehouse receipts, the objects of the
Act were being carried out. But the purpose of the Commissioners was
stated to be to "limit the effectiveness of the transaction to the case of
new acquisitions by the dealer." 43  In most instances in which a dealer
41. As it stood when adopted by the Conference of Commissoners on Uniform State
Laws the subdivision of Section 2 quoted in the text applied only to "instruments," ix.,
securities such as stocks and bonds exhibited by a stockbroker to his banker in connection
with obtaining loans for stock brokerage operations in Wall Street. It appears that the
words "or documents" were omitted by accident from the draft offered for adoption to
the Conference. Hence the words were intended by the drafting committee to be included
in the section. The draftsman suggests that "while the text is adequate as it stands, the
reinsertion of the words 'or documents' in the places mentioned would further the general
purposes of simplifying business procedure and freeing it from technicality and doubt."
HA.MDBOOM (1933) 255.
42. U.T.R.A. § 2 (1) (b), N. Y. Pans. Pnor. Lw (1934) § 52 (1) (b). The Uniform
Act omits "or documents".
43. Notations of the Commissoners: "Hence, the Act leaves the existing law of chattel
mortgages and conditional sale unchanged, except in peculiar cases which need special
coverage. (a) Sec. 1, 'Entruster,' excludes any true seller from the operation of the Act,
and limits the definition of 'Security Interest,' in that section. Thus any true conditional
sale is outside this Act. (b) Sec. 2 (3) by limiting the purposes of a trust receipt trans-
action, excludes the ordinary chattel mortgage, even when made by a dealer. (c) Sec. 2
(1) and Sec. 1, 'New Value,' limit the effectiveness of the transaction to the case of mew
acquisitions by the dealer, as to which the new possession cannot be expected to midsead
his creditors, or to the turning back of security already pledged, while Sec. 14 limits the
financer's protection to new value given as part of the transaction. (d) Finally, Sec. 3
makes it clear that the purposes of the Act cannot be defeated by masking what in sub-
stance would be an unrecorded chattel mortgage under the fo)m of agreement to pledge or
'equitable pledge.'
"The Act accepts the desirability of protecting the new financing of a dealer's incoming
stock (or the release of security to a pledgor) while allowing possession to be in the dealer
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in goods is in possession of a bill of lading or warehouse receipt it will
be a case in which the goods-are indeed in course of transfer from pro-
ducer to wholesaler to retailer,-in which the object of the transaction is
to finance new acquisitions by the trustee. But it might, on the other
hand, be a case in which the holder of the documents which are exhibited
to the lender is a dealer who has already paid for the goods. In that
event he may desire the loan for the purpose of purchasing new goods.
If that is so it may be urged that the transaction still comes within the
functional perspective of the Act. On the other hand the dealer may
desire the loan for the purpose of providing for his payroll or for the
purpose of sending his wife and daughter on a trip to Europe. Never-
theless, provided possession is left with him for the delimited purposes,
it would seem to be a valid trust receipt transaction if he exhibited to
the entruster a document of title, obtained a loan and executed a trust
receipt. The seemingly innocuous addition of the words "or docu-
ments" to this section may, therefore, have opened the door to a method
of avoiding the chattel mortgage law and for defeating creditors in a
way that never was intended.
Two cases may be put, one being within the theory of the Act and
one apparently not:
1. A seller of goods ships under bills of lading naming the buyer as
consignee. The bills of lading are sent directly to the buyer along with
a draft for the price. The buyer exhibits the bills to a bank and simul-
taneously obtains a loan with which to meet the draft, signing a trust
receipt. This is within the purposes of the Act since the loan enables
him to pay for new acquisitions.' It is submitted, however, that such a
transaction was already provided for in the subdivision quoted under
(B) supra,44 in that it is one in which a third person (the seller) de-
livered documents to the trustee as a consequence of which the en-
truster, for new value, by the trust receipt transaction acquired a
security interest. This is not using the Act as a cover for an ordinary
chattel mortgage.
A Masquerading Chattel Mortgage
2. A dealer in second hand cars, having several in "dead storage",
decides to put them up as collateral for a loan. By the simple device of
driving them to a warehouse and bailing them to the warehouseman the
dealer procures a warehouse receipt which he exhibits to the lender,
on the faith of which he obtains a loan in return for a trust receipt. To
be sure possession must be left with him for the purpose of sale but
(or pledgor of securities) for legitimate purposes looking toward realization or substitution ol
the security. This accords both with business practice and business needs." HANDBoosc
(1933) 249. (italics in original.)
44. Supra p. 247.
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there is no requirement that the sale by the trustee must be in immediate
prospect. This seems to be a transaction that ought to be construed as
a chattel mortgage,45 but it appears to be within the terms of the Act."
It may be answered that it is hardly worth while to go to the trouble
of warehousing the goods and incurring warehouse charges just for the
purpose of avoiding the chattel mortgage recording act. It is also true,
as a practical matter, that the lender will in nearly every instance retain
possession of the documents for his own protection. But many and
devious have been the methods used to circumvent creditors. Further-
more the entruster's interest, when acquired by a valid trust receipt
transaction, is good against creditors of the trustee for thirty days with-
out compliance with the filing provisions of the Act. 7 If experience
shows that any unwarranted advantage is taken of this part of the Act
perhaps it can be remedied by adding some such provision as: "Provided
that, in the case of documents, the new value is given for the purpose of
financing the purchase of the goods represented by the documents."
The courts, however, will doubtless construe the Act in the light of its
purposes and can be depended upon to defeat attempts to use it as a
cover for ordinary chattel mortgage transactions which are not primarily
concerned with financing the transfer of goods in the course of trade
from producer to wholesaler to retailer, especially if such an attempt
carries the badge of fraud. It should also be noticed that the filing pro-
visions of the Act are limited to trust receipt transactions relating to
the financing of acquisitions of goods by a dealer. This reinforces the
conclusion that the statute is not intended to cover an ordinary mortgage
which is set up in the language of trust receipts. The filing provisions,
which are somewhat unusual, will be described hereafter.
The, Importance of New Value
It will not have escaped notice that in all the types of transactions
provided for by the Act the entruster must have furnished new valte in
45. Or suppose that Mcawber in the illustration put supra p. 243 first warehoused his
car and procured a receipt which he exhibited to Lender and then executed a trust receipt
containing a power of sale. He might in fact have a customer in view and merely want
the loan to carry him along until he effected the sale. Would it be a valid trust receipt
transaction?
46. It might be thought that U.T.RA. § 15 excludes such a transaction [N. Y. Prns
PRop. LAW (1934) § 53-g] but that section appears to apply only when the trustee is a
"fiduciary" handling investments or finances of the eniruster. The section reads:
"This article shall not apply to single transactions of legal or equitable pledge, not con-
stituting a course of business, whether such transactions be unaccompanied by delivery of
possession, or involve constructive delivery, or delivery o~r edelivery, actual or constructive,
so far as s=ch transactions involve only an entruster who is an individual natural peron,
and a trustee entrusted as a fiduciary with handling investments or finances of the en-
truster . . . " (italics inserted).
47. P. 262, infra.
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return for his interest, except in the one case in which his security inter-
est in the goods or documents existed prior to the trust receipt transac-
tion, in which case merely value is sufficient." New value is defined as
follows:
" 'New value' includes new advances or loans made, or new obliga-
tions incurred, or the release or surrender of a valid and existing security
interest, or the release of a claim to proceeds under Section 10; but
'new value' shall not be construed to include extensions or renewals of
existing obligations of the trustee, nor obligations substituted for such
existing obligations."49
Trust receipts executed in the past have frequently provided that the
goods are to secure not only the new advances made by the entruster as
a part of the transaction but also are to secure any other indebtedness
of the trustee to the entruster previously existing or thereafter to be
created. By the Act, however, such a provision is made invalid as
against purchasers of the goods or creditors of the trustee. The ell-
truster's interest is limited to the new value given as a part of the
transaction, again with the exception that his interest may extend to
any obligation for which the goods or documents were security prior to
the transaction. 0 New value is likewise important in its effect upon the
rights of third persons who take the goods from the trustee by purchase,
mortgage or pledge, as will hereafter appear.
Purchasers of Negotiable Documents from the Trustee
When documents like bills of lading or warehouse' receipts are de-
livered to or left with the trustee under a trust receipt transaction they
are pretty likely to be negotiable in form. It is the modern case law that
if the trustee should, without authority, negotiate such documents to a
purchaser in good faith and for value such purchaser would take free
of the entruster's interest.r1 The Act continues this protection even
though the trust receipt transaction has been filed; filing does not con-
stitute constructive notice to such purchasers."' In this instance new
value given by the buyer is not a requisite. Thus the Act preserves un-
impaired the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Bills of
Lading Act and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act.53
48. For an illustration of the exceptional case, see (A), p. 245, supra.
49. U.T.R.A. § 1, N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 51 (7).
50. See (A), p. 245, supra. U.T.R.A. § 14, N. Y. PEgs. PRop. LAW (1934) § 58-f. And
see HANmDBOOK (1927) 609, 611.
51. Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N. E. 1025 (1913).
52. U.T.R.A. § 9 (1) (a), N. Y. PEs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58-a (1) (a). ThIs sub-
division requires value but not new value. For a definition of value see U.T.R.A. § 1, N.
Y. PEGs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 51. It includes antecedent indebtedness.
53. UNNvopa SALEs ACT §§ 33, 34, 38, N. Y. PEgs. PROP. LAW (1935) §§ 113, 114, 119;
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It sometimes happens that the trustee who is in possession of bills
of lading under a trust receipt transaction secures the goods from the
carrier and warehouses them, taking out warehouse receipts to his own
order. Then, acting beyond the authority given in the trust receipt, he
negotiates the substituted documents to a pledgee or purchaser without
notice, and for value. In this case also the endorsee of the warehouse
receipt is protected regardless of filing and again new value is not re-
quired." A few of the cases heretofore reported reached the same result
upon the theory that, under the facts before the court, authority to take
out such substituted documents could be implied, hence it was held that
the trustee was "entrusted" with the negotiable warehouse receipts and
that the endorsee was protected by the provisions of the Uniform Ware-
house Receipts ActY Under the Act, however, it is not necessary to look
for such implied authority. The Act, it may be said, supplies the
authority. 6
'Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Trade
When the trustee under a trust receipt transaction makes a sale of
the goods, or of non-negotiable documents representing the goods, the
buyer is also given extended protection as against the entruster, but
not quite as much under all circumstances as when order or bearer docu-
ments are negotiated to him. Two important facts in such a case are
to be looked for, first, whether or not the trustee had liberty of sale, and
secondly, whether or not the buyer gave new value. If the trustee had
in fact a liberty of sale and his buyer acted in good faith, without
notice and paid new value, then, under the Act, he is a "buyer in the
ordinary course of trade" and again takes free of the entruster's interest
regardless of filingY Furthermore any limitation placed by the en-
truster upon the trustee's liberty of sale, which is not actually known
UN=ORm BaLts OF LADING ACT §§ 31, 32, 38, N. Y. PERs. PROP. Ltw (1911) §§ 217, 218,
224; UPiroaRm WARmousE RECis Acr §§ 40, 41, 47, N. Y. Pnis. PROP. LAW (1929) §§
124, 125, 131. Under all these acts antecedent indebtedness is value.
54. U.T.R.A. § 9 (1) (b), N. Y. PEns. PROP. LAw (1934) § 58-a (1) (b). This sec-
tion of the Act would apply even in a case in which the entruster or a third person (such
as the seller) delivered to or left with the trustee non-negotiable documents or merely the
goods themselves.
55. Commercial Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Co.,
239 U. S. 520 (1916); In re Richheimer, 221 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915).
56. "The Act proceeds on the theory that the entruster . . . is entitled to protection
only against honest insolvency of the trustee. Dishonest action of the trustee is a credit
risk, and bona fide purchasers are to be protected against the entruster who has taken that
risk by entrusting." H,,-aBoox (1933) 241.
57. U.TR.A. § 9 (2) (a) (i), (ii), N. Y. PERs. PROP. Lw (1934) § 58-a (a) (i),
(ii) (definition of "buyer in the ordinary course of trade"); U.T.RA. § 1, N. Y. Pans.
PROP. LAw (1934) § 51 (1) (a mortgagee is not included). See also U.T.R.A. § 1, N. Y.
Pirs. PROP. LAw (1934) § 51 (7) (definition of "new value").
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to the buyer, is without effect. Thus if the entruster authorizes a sale
only for cash but the trustee negotiates a sale on credit the title of the
credit buyer will be protected.', The Act, therefore, as to a buyer in the
ordinary course of trade conforms to the rule under the Factor's Act
in New York,59 even though a record of the transaction has been filed.
Liberty of Sale as Matter of Law
It has been assumed in the preceding paragraph that the buyer
bought from a trustee who had, in fact, a liberty of sale. Most trust
receipts executed in the past have provided that the trustee may sell
the goods. It is by making a sale that the trustee is usually expected
to obtain the funds with which to reimburse the financing agent for its
advances. Now and then, however, a case is met with in which the
trustee is prohibited from making a sale.?0 In other cases he is allowed
to exhibit the goods for the purpose of obtaining offers from prospective
buyers but with the limitation that such offers are to be submitted to the
financing agent for approval before a sale is authorized.01 In both of
these cases there is no liberty of sale in fact. This being so the Fac-
tor's Act would not protect a buyer if the trustee sold in violation of his
instructions nor would the possession by the trustee raise an estoppel. 2
The New York Court of Appeals has consistently held that possession,
even when coupled with authority to exhibit goods and to obtain offers,
58. U.T.R.A. § 9 (2) (a) (ii), N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58-a (2) (a) (i). But
see U.T.RA. § 9 (3), N. Y. )?ERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58-a (3), which provides that
although the purchase of goods or documents (non-negotiable for instance) on credit terms
constitutes new value, the entruster is entitled to any debt owed by the buyer to the
trustee arising out of the purchase and any security given therefor. Such a credit purchaser,
however, may assert against the entruster who claims the debt or security any set-off or
defense that would have been valid against the trustee which accrued to the purchaser
before he had actual notice of the entruster's interest. This subdivision will be important
if the trustee becomes bankrupt and it appears to prefer the entruster over general creditors
to this specific asset of the bankrupt's estate. See Entruster's Right to Proceeds, inra
p. 263.
59. N. Y. Prs. PROP. LAW (1915) § 43. It is to be noticed, however, that under the Uni-
form Trust Receipts Act pledgees are not "buyers in the ordinary course of trade" even
though such pledgees give new value. Under the Factor's Act a pledgee is protected if he
makes a loan in return for a pledge of the goods which have been entrusted to another who
is given a power of sale. Freudenheim v. Gfitter, 201 N. Y. 94, 94 N. E. 640 (1911).
Under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act a pledgee of the trustee will prevail against the
entruster in some circumstances but is subordinated to the latter's interest in others, as
will hereafter appear. Infra p. 260.
60. Farmers & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. $68 (1878); Glass v. Con-
tinental Guaranty Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921) semtble.
61. Such was the case as to the General Motors trust receipts in In re James, Inc., 30
F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
62. Farmers & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568 (1878). See also the
preceding instalment, (1936) 5 FORDHAm L. REV. 17, 47.
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given to one who regularly deals in such goods does not, without more,
estop the title holder.'
It is the policy of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, however, to pro-
tect the entruster "only against honest inzsolvcncy of the trustee. Dis-
honest action of the trustee is a credit risk, and bona fide purchasers
are to be protected against the entruster who has taken that risk by
entrusting."" To carry out this policy it is provided:
"If the entruster consents to the placing of goods subject to a trust
receipt transaction in the trustee's stock in trade or in his sales or
exhibition rooms, or allows such goods to be so placed or kept, such
consent or allowance shall have like effect as granting the trustee liberty
of sale."65
This section, therefore, effects a change in the common law rule in
New York, not only when a trust receipt is actually executed but also,
as will next appear, when the parties attempt to evade the Act by re-
sorting to a chattel mortgage which is filed of record. This may be
illustrated by a leading New York case.
Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Decker"0
Four automobiles had been shipped to a retail dealer. For the pur-
pose of obtaining the money with which to pay for the cars the dealer
gave to the plaintiff bank a note secured by a chattel mortgage which
transferred title to the bank. By the terms of the mortgage it was pro-
vided that the dealer was not to sell any of the cars nor to use them for
other than exhibition purposes until a release was given by the bank.6"
The mortgage was filed. With the fund received from the bank the
dealer paid for the cars. Subsequently the dealer sold one of the cars
to the defendant who paid new value without actual notice of the ex-
istence of the mortgage. The court held that the bank could foreclose
the mortgage and sell the car to satisfy the mortgage debt remaining un-
paid.
It is submitted that under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act the de-
fendant in the Utica case would be protected. The transaction was in
63. Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Decker, 244 N. Y. 340, 155 N. E. 665 (1927). Com-
pare Smith v. Clews, 105 N. Y. 283, 11 N. E. 632 (1887) with the same aLse on the second
appeal in 114 N. Y. 190, 21 N. E. 160 (1889). Accord: Levi v. Booth, 58 Mld. 305 (182).
These were not trust receipt cases but there is no reason to believe the principle would not
govern the trust Yeceipt cases at common law. Contra: Glass v. Continental Guaranty
Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921); Clark v. Flynn, 120 Misc. 474, 199 N. Y. Supp.
583 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Randy v. C. I. T. Corp., 197 N. E. 641 (M6ass. 1935).
64. HANDBooX (1933) 249 (italics in original); see also id. at 252.
65. U.T.R.A. § 9 (2) (c), N. Y. PaMs. PRoP. LAw (1934) § 5S-a (2) (c).
66. 244 N. Y. 340, 155 N. E. 665 (1927).




substance a trust receipt transaction. It was a case in which the bank
gave new value and by the transaction acquired a security interest in
goods which had been delivered to the trustee by a third person. 8 But
it was also within the terms of the chattel mortgage recording act."
Therefore it would seem that the bank could take its choice of the two
statutes. That is true up to a point.
If it chooses to comply with the chattel mortgage recording act the
bank would have the protection of that law in all respects but one, that
one being that the defendant, who was a buyer in the ordinary course
of trade as defined by the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, is entitled to
the protection of that Act in any event. The applicable sections justi-
fying this conclusion are set out in full in the footnote.10 The dealer in
the Utica case was allowed to exhibit the goods in his sales room and
so, as a matter of law, under the Act, he had liberty of sale in spite of
the express prohibition in the chattel mortgage agreement. It is just
such cases that the Act is intended to cover for the protection of the
innocent purchaser who gives new value."
68. (B), p. 245, supra; if not that then it surely falls under (C), p. 249, supra.
69. N. Y. IIEN LAW (1911) § 230 et seq.
70. "As to any transaction falling within the provisions both of this article and of
any other law requiring filing or recording, the entruster shall not be required to comply
with both, but by complying with the provisions of either at his election may have the
protection given by the law complied with; except that buyers in the ordinary cotrse of
trade as" described in Stgbsection 2 of Sectios 9 [58-a], and lienors as described in Section
11 [58-c], shall be protected as therein provided, although compliance of the entruster be
with the filing or recording reqidrements of another law." U.T.R.A. § 16, N. Y. PERs. Pao.
LAW (1934) § 58-h (italics inserted).
"Subsection 2 of Section 9" referred to in the foregoing is the one which contains the
liberty of sale provisions quoted in the text and which defines the rights of the buyer in
the ordinary course of trade.
"Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or special law, the provisions of this
article shall control excepting as to trust receipts and pledge transactions entered into be-
fore this article, as hereby added, takes effect." N. Y. PzRS. PROP. LAw (1934) § 59-1. This
section is not in the Uniform Act as adopted by the Commissioners, but has been added
by all the states which have adopted the Act.
71. "It frees him (as do the majority of decisions) from ibeing affected by any restric-
tion placed on the trustee's power of sale, unless the purchaser has notice of the restric-
tion. . . . It frees him (as do the majority of decisions) from any prohibition placed by
the entruster on sale by the trustee, wherever the entruster has allowed the goods to be
placed in the trustee's stock in trade or sales room. . . . And those protections are extended
equally to cases where the entruster chooses to comply with some other applicable statute
e.g., the chattel mortgage regulations." HFANDBoox (1933) 252.
See also the forceful language of the Court of Appeals on the policy of the Factor's Act
in Freudenheim v. GUtter, 201 N. Y. 94, 94 N. E. 640 (1911). The Trust Receipts Act goes
one step further than the Factor's Act toward abrogating the harsh, if logically sound, rule
of the common law that the true owner can reclaim his property even though his agent
had possession and was apparently the actual owner as a dealer in such goods.
It should be observed, however, that when a general owner of goods, as distinguished
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It is still possible, however, for the entruster to effectively prohibit
the trustee from making any disposition of the goods without the ap-
proval of the entruster. The entruster could, for example, require the
trustee to store the goods in a public warehouse and turn back the
receipts. In such case, of course, it could not be said that the entruster
had allowed the trustee to place the goods in the trustee's stock in trade
or in his sales or exhibition rooms. But even in such a case the entruster
will have to take the risk that the trustee might obtain negotiable
documents running to his own order and then negotiate them to an
innocent purchaser for new value or in cancellation of an indebtedness. 2
There will, of course, be borderline cases not involving negotiable docu-
ments in which it will be a close question as to whether or not the
entruster has allowed the trustee to place the goods in his stock in
trade.7
3
from an entruster, entrusts possession to a dealer in such goods for the sole purpose of ob-
taining offers, the rule remains the same as before. The Act will not affect Smith v.
Clews, 105 N. Y. 233, 11 N. E. 632 (1887), nor Green v. Wachs, 254 N. Y. 437, 173 N. E.
575 (1930).
72. See heading Purchasers of Negotiable Documents, p. 254, supra.
73. For example: In Farmers & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 565 (1878),
discussed as to other points at p. 245, supra, the entrusting bank gave to the trustee the
bills of lading with a notice stamped upon their face that the wheat represented by the
bills was entrusted to him but was not to be diverted to any use until its advances had
been paid. The object of putting the trustee, Brown, in possession was apparently to get
the goods into storage and thus avoid the carrier's demurrage charges. Brown was a trader
on the New York Produce Exchange and he obtained samples of the wheat in question
which he exhibited upon the Exchange. Relying upon his possession the defendant Logan
bought the wheat and shipped it abroad. Presumably the wheat was in warehouse. A-uming
that negotiable warehouse receipts were not obtained by Brown and negotiated to Logan
but that he transferred non-negotiable receipts to Logan, what would be the latter's pos-
tion under the Act?
A trader of goods upon the Produce Exchange, if he has any stock in trade as he well
might be regarded to have, would necessarily keep it in public warehouses. Did the Bank
then allow him to place the goods in his stock in trade? It would seem that any person
who is engaged in trade, whether it be selling automobiles in a retail showroom, tanning
leather in a tannery, or buying and selling upon a commodity exchange, has a stock in
trade. (Brown was not acting merely as a broker). The court held in the Logan case
that the bank was not estopped and that Logan had constructive notice of the limitation
upon the bills of lading. Under the Act, however, "No limitation placed by the entruster
on the liberty of sale granted to the trustee shall affect a buyer in the ordinary course of
trade, unless the limitation is actually known to the latter." U.T.R.A. § 9 (2) (a) (ii),
N. Y. Pans. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58-a (2) (a) (ii). Even if it is said that this subdivision
would not be applicable for the reason that it assumes a limited power of sale actually
granted, yet it is the object of the Act to abrogate the theory of constructive notice even
when there is a filing, so far as buyers for new value a e concerned. It would seem that
Logan, therefore, ought not to be charged with constructive notice of the contents of the
bills of lading. Then the question is reduced to the one asked at the opening of this
paragraph. The writer submits that Logan was within the policy of the Act, which is to
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Purchasers Not Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Trade
Although buyers from the trustee who give new value are protected
under almost all circumstances, this is not true as to the persons who
are classified by the Act as "purchasers other than buyers in the ordinary
course of trade." 4  Such purchasers include pledgees of the trustee,
mortgagees, buyers of the goods who do not give new value, (e.g., those
who take title from the trustee in cancellation of a debt), and trans-
ferees of the trustee in bulk sale transactions. If the entruster has com-
plied with the filing provisions of the Act at the outset of the trust
receipt transaction he is fully protected against the interest of such
purchasers, pledgees and mortgagees. But if there is a delay in filing
the situation is somewhat complicated. It will be best to deal with
the matter in detail:
1. Transferees in bulk. As to such persons the entruster is protected
in any event for a period of thirty days after he has delivered the goods
or documents to the trustee. But if filing is delayed for more than thirty
days and the bulk sale is thereafter made before any filing takes place
the transferee takes free of the entruster's interest provided he also
takes delivery of the goods. If the bulk sale takes place after filing,
no matter how long delayed, the transferee in bulk is deemed to have
notice of the entruster's interest.75 As to transferees in bulk it matters
not whether new value or merely value is the consideration for the bulk
sale.
2. A pledgee or mortgagee of the trustee. Two situations are possible
as to such a person.
(a) He gives new value by making a new loan, or undertaking a new
obligation, within thirty days from the time the entruster delivered the
goods or documents to the trustee. In such a case, if the entruster has
not complied with the filing provisions, the pledgee or mortgagee takes
free of the entruster's interest provided he has received delivery of the
goods or documents which were pledged or mortgaged to him without
notice of the entruster's interest.76
(b) He either gives new value, or accepts the goods or documents
protect purchasers from the trustee who give new value. See further the preceding instal-
ment, (1936) 5 FoRDHAm L. REv. 17, 47, n128.
The liens of carriers, warehousemen and third persons who have expended labor
upon the goods may be maintained against the entruster regardless of filing. The entruster,
however, is not personally liable for the debt secured by the lien. U.T.RA. § 11, N. Y.
PERS. PaOP. LAW (1934) §58-c. Contra: Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252
(C. C. A. 3d, 1912) semble.
74. U.T.R-A. § 9 (2) (b), N. Y. PERS. PaoP. LAw (1934) § 58-a (2) (b) ; see also, de-
finition of "purchasers", U.T.R.A. § 1, N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 51 (11).
75. U.T.R.A. § 9 (2) (b) (ii), N. Y. PaS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58-a (2) (b) (i1). The
unique filing provisions of the Act will be described later. P. 264, infra.
76. U.T.R.A. § 9 (2) (b) (i), N. Y. Pans. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58-a (2) (b) (1),
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which were pledged or mortgaged to him in cancellation of a debt or as
security therefor, after the thirty day period has expired. In that event
he takes free of the entruster's interest only if the pledge or mortgage
is made before the filing provisions have been complied with, again
provided he has taken delivery and is without notice. But whenever
he deals with the trustee after the entruster has filed he is subordinated
to the entruster's interest.77
3. Buyers of non-negotiable documents, or of the goods, who in either
case take titli in catcellation of a debt. Since such buyers do not give
new value they are protected only if the transaction is entered into after
the thirty day period has expired and before the filing provisions have
been complied with. For the thirty day period the entruster is pro-
tected regardless of filing as against such purchasers."8
The theory of the foregoing provisions is that in the ordinary case
the purposes of the trust receipt transaction will have been fulfilled with-
in thirty days, i.e., the goods will have been sold, stored, transshipped,
etc. During that short period the entruster ought to have protection,
even without filing, as against persons who do not give new value. As
between such persons and the entruster the equities favor the entruster
who has actually financed the acquisition of the goods which have been
added to the trustee's estate. Therefore, this temporary protection
cannot be regarded as unfair. But in the absence of filing the entruster
is subordinated to mortgagees and pledgees who have relied upon the
possession of the trustee and have given new value within the thirty day
period. This also seems fair and is consistent with the policy of the
Act to cast upon the entruster the risk of dishonest dealing on the part
of his trustee as to those persons who are actually out of pocket because
of the trustee's dishonest action."0 If, however, the transaction is likely
to take more than thirty days before it is closed out, as when the goods
require processing, the entruster has the duty to comply with the filing
provisions if he would be protected against third persons who thereafter
deal with the trustee on the faith of his possession of the goods or of
non-negotiable documents, whether they give new value or not.80
77. U.T.RA. § 9 (2) (b) (ii), N. Y. P.Rs. PRoP. L, (1934) § 58-a (2) (b) (ii).
7S. Ibid. The subdivision mentions only purchasers of "goods" but it seems clear that
purchasers of non-negotiable documents are included.
In the three types of transactions in which the entruster or a third person (such as the
seller) delivers goods or documents to the trustee the thirty day period is figured from the
date of the delivery. In the case in which documents are exhibited by the trustee to the
entruster the thirty days are figured from the time when the documents are shown to the
entruster or from the time he gives new value, whichever is prior. U.T.RA. § 7, N. Y.
PERs. P op. LAw. (1934) § 57.
79. Supra p. 257.
80. "After filing no pledgee, mortgagee or transferee in bulk can take free of the en-
truster's interest. The reason is clear: All of these are persons whose busineS3 it is to look
up the status of any trustee with whom they are dealing." Hmnoo (1933) 253.
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Creditors of the Trustee
At common law the entruster's interest under a valid trust receipt
transaction was held to be superior to the interest of attaching creditors
of the trustee and to that of receivers and trustees in bankruptcy, even
though the transaction was not filed as a conditional sale or chattel
mortgage, with which security arrangements the trust receipt trans-
action has points of similarity.8' This ruling did not seem to be alto-
gether in accord with the spirit of the existing recording acts and has
now been modified by the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. The entruster's
interest, to the extent of the new value he has given as a part of the
trust receipt transaction, is still valid without any filing for a period
of thirty days after delivery by the entruster or any third person to the
trustee of the goods or documents involved in the transaction. That is
also true ag to his interest in the case first described as a trust receipt
transaction in which the entruster's security interest existed prior to
the transaction. 2
If, however, the thirty day period has expired a creditor who there-
after acquires a lien upon the goods by attachment, levy or other
legal process, and before the filing provisions have been complied with,
will prevail over the entruster provided the creditor is without notice of
the entruster's interest."' Compliance with the filing provisions at any
time, however, will cut off the rights of such lien creditors who thereafter
levy upon or attach the goods, the filing being deemed to be constructive
notice." It should be added that the taking of possession by the en-
truster has the effect of filing as long as he remains in possession.88
An interesting provision is the one regulating the position of trustees
in bankruptcy and like representatives of the creditors of an insolvent
trustee. If the thirty day filing period has expired and no filing has as
yet taken place "(i) an assignee for the benefit of creditors, from the
time of assignment, or (ii) a receiver in equity from the time of his
appointment, or (iii) a trustee in bankruptcy or judicial insolvency
proceedings from the time of filing of the petition in bankruptcy or
judicial insolvency by or against the trustee, shall, on behalf of all
creditors, stand in the position of a lien creditor without notice, without
reference to whether he personally has or has not, in fact, notice of the
81. See preceding instalment, (1936) 5 FoRDHAm L. REv. 17, 36-42.
82. U.T.RA. §§ 7, 8, 14, N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAW (1934) §§ 57, 58, 58-f. See heading
Importance of New Value, p. 253; heading (A), p. 245 and note 78, all sypra.
83. U.T.RA. 99 1, 8 (2), N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) §§ 51 (6), 58 (2).
84. U.T.R.A. § 7, N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW (1934) § 57.
85. U.T.RA. § 7 (2), N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAw (1934) § 57 (2). Placing tags upon the
goods or posting conspicuous notices in the trustee's place of business is equivalent to taking
possession. U.T.RA. § 1, N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAw (1934) § 51 (9) (definition of "posses-
sion").
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entruster's interest" provided any one of the creditors had no notice.8"
That is to say, such a representative, in such circumstances, can hold
the goods or documents as part of the assets of the estate in defiance of
the entruster.
Entruster's Right to Proceeds
After goods or documents have been delivered to, or documents left
with, the trustee it will frequently happen that the trustee will more or
less promptly dispose of the goods or documents. Should bankruptcy
proceedings thereafter be initiated the entruster may, under certain cir-
cumstances, occupy a preferred position as to the proceeds of the goods
or documents remaining in the trustee's estate. The entruster is en-
titled to this preferential position as against an assignee, equity receiver
or bankruptcy trustee only if his security interest "was valid at the
time of disposition by the trustee. 87  This requirement seems to be
fulfilled if the disposition is made after the entruster has complied with
the filing provisions, or, in the absence of such compliance, then only if
the disposition was made within thirty days after the goods or docu-
ments were delivered to the trustee or the documents were exhibited by
the latter to the entruster85 A further limitation placed upon the en-
truster's right to proceeds is that the terms of the trust receipt transac-
tion must have prohibited any disposition of the goods, or if the trust
receipt contained a liberty of sale then the trustee must have been under
a duty to account for the proceeds. With these limitations in mind the
entruster's right to proceeds if the trustee defaults may be illustrated as
follows:
1. The trustee has sold the goods or documents on credit terms to a
buyer. In such event the entruster is subrogated to the debt owed by
the purchaser to the trustee. He is also subrogated to any security given
by the buyer to the trustee.89
2. The trustee sold the goods or documents for cash and went into
86. U.T.R.A. § 8 (3) (b), N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58 (3) (b).
87. U.T.RA. § 10, N. Y. P.Rs. PROP. LAw (1934) § 58-b.
88. See heading Creditors of the Trustee, p. 262, supra, and footnotes thereto. If more
than thirty days have expired and the disposition of the goods or documents by the t-uctee
thereafter takes place but before the assignment for the benefit of creditors, filing of the
petition in bankruptcy or appointment of the receiver in equity, it might be argued that
the entruster's interest in the goods was still valid, its validity not yet having been attacked.
However, it seems to be the policy of the Act to give the entruster his superior protection
only for the period of thirty days and that after such a period he ought to be comp2lled
to file. "The Act works to the interest of general creditors ... by making any failure to
comply with the Act redound to the benefit of the representatives of general creditors."
(italics in original) HAMwBoox (1933) 255. See also U.T.R.A. § 14, N. Y. PERs. Pnop.
LAw (1934) § 58-f.
89. U.T.RA. § 10 (a), N. Y. PEns. Pnop. LAw (1934) § 58-b (a).
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bankruptcy within ten days after receiving the proceeds of the sale. The
entruster is a preferred creditor to the amount or value of such proceeds
whether they are identifiable or not.90
3. The trustee, having a liberty of sale and being under a duty to ac-
count, sells the goods or documents for cash which he expends in buying
other goods. If the goods so purchased are still part of the assets of
the trustee's estate the entruster is entitled to them. But if the en-
truster has knowledge that such proceeds exist and has not demanded
an accounting within ten days after acquiring such knowledge he is
deemed to have waived the duty of the trustee to account."1
It will appear from the foregoing discussion of the rights of creditors
of the trustee and of the entruster's right to proceeds in certain events
that the entruster is given extensive protection for a period of thirty
days after the goods or documents have been delivered to the trustee.
These rights he had at common law for an unlimited period under a
valid trust receipt transaction although perhaps the common law did not
go so far in the case of unidentifiable proceeds. The Act, however, has
limited the entruster's rights by requiring compliance with the filing
provisions if he would be safe after thirty days. It remains to be con-
sidered what are these filing provisions.
Filing
The filing requirements of the Act are rather unique. The reader
may have assumed whenever reference to "compliance with the filing
provisions" has been made that, as in the case of chattel mortgages
and conditional sales, each transaction must be individually filed. But
that is not the case. One notice filed with the Secretary of State which
is signed by the entruster and by the trustee giving their respective
business addresses and which announces that they are undertaking or
contemplating trust receipt transactions with reference to the acquisi-
tion by the trustee of silk (or coffee or automobiles, i.e., designating
the kind of goods), constitutes a sufficient filing as to all transactions
concluded between them for a year following the date of filing. The
notice also constitutes filing as to all transactions concluded within
thirty days prior to such date. Refiling within the year of a like notice
extends the entruster's existing security interest for another twelve
months and covers new transactions as well.92
90. U.T.RA. § 10 (b), N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58-b (b). This subdivision
also provides that the entruster is entitled to the amount or value of such procecds If he
demands an accounting within ten days of the disposition of the goods oir documents by
the trustee even though no bankruptcy proceedings have been instituted.
91. U.T.RA. § 10 (c), N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58-b (c). The common law
aspects of the entruster's right to proceeds are discussed very thoroughly by Frederick, The
Trust Receipt as Security I (1922) 22 Cov, L. R~v. 546, 554-558.
92. U.T.R.A. § 13, N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAw (1934) § 58-c. If the entruster takes posses-
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Although this method is unusual it seems to be adequate. Buyers
from the trustee who pay cash for the goods or who buy on credit are
given protection against the entruster whether there has been a filing
or not; prospective creditors, mortgagees, and pledgees of the trustee
and persons who propose to take from him in cancellation of indebted-
ness can learn from the record that merchandise he has on hand cannot
be relied upon and then make further investigation. "All of these are
persons whose business it is to look up the status of any trustee with
whom they are dealing."93
Entruster and Trustee
At common law there may have been some doubt as to the rights
between the parties to a trust receipt transaction due to the conflicting
definitions of the entruster's interest." These doubts have been fully
resolved by the Act. The entruster, until the secured debt has been
satisfied, has a property interest in the goods or documents limited in
extent to securing performance of the trustee's obligation even though
the terms of the agreement express his interest as that of absolute owner-
ship.95 It therefore follows that upon timely performance by the
trustee of his obligations he automatically becomes the absolute owner.
It also appears by reasonable inference from the Act that the trustee
has a property interest in the goods which he may assert against the
entruster in an action for conversion should the entruster wrongfully
take possession before default or refuse to surrender possession upon a
tender of due performance by the trustee.""
Should the trustee default while he is still in possession of the goods
or documents, the entruster may take possession without legal process,
whenever that is possible without committing a breach of the peace.
An entruster who has taken possession from the trustee holds the goods
with the rights and duties of a pledgee but he may, following a default,
sell the goods or documents after giving the trustee five days notice.
An entruster after default and notice may make the sale at a public
or private sale. He may himself become a purchaser at a public sale.
sion, that is equivalent to filing as long as he remains in possesson. U.T.R.A. § 7 (2), N.
Y. PERPS. PROP. LAw (1934) § 57 (2). Placing tags upon the goods or posting conspicuous
notices in the trustee's place of business is deemed constructive possession. U.TLA. § 1,
N. Y. PEas. PRoP. LAw (1934) § 51 (9) (definition of "posse-sion").
93. ]AisuDBOOx (1933) 253; see note 80, supra.
94. See the preceding instalment of this article, (1936) 5 FoRnnic L. RE,. 17, 24-32.
95. U.T.R.A. § 1, N. Y. Pus. PROP. LAW (1934) § 51 (12) (definition of "Security
interest"). This definition is quoted in full in note 38, supra.
96. U.T.RA. § 6 (3) (c), N. Y. Pa-,s. PROP. LAvi (1934) § 56 (3) (c). See also the
case put in the previous installment, (1936) 5 Fonomkri L. RIv. 17, 29, and discussion
thereon, id. at 31.
97. TJ.T.R.A. § 6 (2), N. Y. PEas. PROP. LV, (1934) § 56 (2).
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He must, however, account to the trustee for any surplus obtained
above the debt secured by the goods or documents. The trustee would
be liable, of course, to make up any deficiency.98
Style or Model Goods
The statute, therefore, protects the trustee from a total forfeiture of
his interest. Furthermore, any terms in the trust receipt, or in a con-
tract to give a trust receipt, which contemplate a forfeiture are invalid
except in one instance. This is when the subject matter of the transac-
tion consists of goods, or documents representing goods which are manu-
factured by "style or model", such as womens' hats for example. In
this instance the trust receipt may contain a provision permitting the
forfeiture of the trustee's interest upon default at the election of the
entruster. Style and model goods, of course are apt to depreciate
rapidly in value at the close of a season or if, overnight, the whim of
the feminine public takes a new direction. In the case of such goods
there is always the risk that by the time the trustee's performance is
due, styles may have changed or the model be outmoded. If the trust
receipt covering a transaction in such goods provides for a forfeiture of
the trustee's interest and the entruster chooses to exercise his option he
is not then bound to sell, but if he does sell he need not account for any
surplus as he is then selling on his own account and not for the purpose
of foreclosing his security interest. In that event, however, he must
cancel at least eighty percent of the trustee's remaining indebtedness. 9
Of course, if the goods have depreciated in value the entruster will not
care to exercise his option but will choose to sell on his debtor's account
and sue for the actual deficiency. Should it happen that the goods have
increased, or are likely to increase, in value he will probably prefer to
exercise the option so that he can pocket any surplus over the indebted-
98. U.T.R-A. § 6 (3) (a), (b), N. Y. Pmas. PROP. LAW (1934) § 56 (3) (a), (b). The
analogy to the unpaid seller's right of esale under a lien is rather close here, and cases
dealing with the fairness and good faith of the unpaid seller's action in reselling the goods
will probably be in point. See UmIroRm SALEs ACT § 60, N. Y. PaRS. PROP. LAW (1911)
§ 141. Two points of difference should be noted: (1) Under the Uniform Sales Act notice
is not a requisite; (2) The unpaid seller does not have to account for a surplus. D'Aprlle
v. Turner-Looker Co., -239 N. Y. 427, 147 N. E. 15 (1925).
99. U.T.R.A. § 6 (5), N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAw (1934) § 56 (5). Inasmuch as opinions
might differ as to the interpretation of this subdivision it is here quoted in full: "5. As to
articles manufactured by style or model, the terms of the trust receipt may provide for
forfeiture of the trustee's interest, at the election of the entruster, in the event of the
trustee's default, against cancellation of the trustee's then remaining indebtedness; provided
that in the case of the original maturity of such an indebtedness there must be cancelled
not less than 80% of the purchase price to the trustee, or of the original indebtedness,
whichever is greater; or, in the case of a first renewal, not less than 70%, or in the case
of a second or further renewal, not less than 609."
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ness which he obtains at a sale. In the event that he does exercise the
option and his calculations miscarry, in that after holding for a sale
on his own account the bottom falls from under the market, he can at
the most only recover from the debter twenty percent of the remaining
indebtedness.
Just what type of goods are "manufactured by style or model" is not
very clear. A great many types of goods are now style or model goods.
Automobiles are produced in annual models; modernistic furniture is
style goods. Indeed in a broad sense nearly all manufactured articles
which are advertised and sold under trade names might be called style
or model goods. Yet the market price of most of such goods remains
fairly stable over many months, even years. It seems to be intended
that the one case in which the trustee may be subjected to a forefeiture
is an exceptional case. Therefore it is submitted that "style or model"
goods should be construed to mean only those which may be expected
to be popular for a short season, after which they are likely to drop out
of the market or to considerably depreciate in value due to the changing
fancy of the buying public. An analogy to the Uniform Sales Act
provision relating to the seller's action for the price may be suggested.
As a general rule under that statute the seller may sue for the purchase
price, as distinguished from an action for damages for breach of con-
tract, only when title has passed to the buyer. But one of the exceptions
is that he may sue for the price if the goods cannot readily be resold in
the seller's regular market for a reasonable amount.10
Whatever construction may be given to this "style and model" sec-
tion of the Act, it is only as to such goods that the parties may provide
by the terms of the original agreement for a forfeiture of the trustee's
interest. After default on his obligation, however, the trustee may sur-
render his interest to the entruster in any case and on any terms. 1'0
Finally, should the entruster wrongfully retake or wrongfully sell, a
purchaser in good faith from him will acquire a title free from the
trustee's interest even though the entruster's act constituted a conversion
as against the trustee. The purchaser from the trustee in this instance
is not required to give new value but merely value.102
Incomplete Pledge Transactions
Now that the discussion as to what constitutes a trust receipt trans-
action and the analysis of the rights of all the interested parties con-
nected with it has been brought to a close, it might be supposed that
100. Us-noaRm SALAs Acr § 63, N. Y. PEs. PRop. LAw (1911) § 144; Illustrated Postal
Card & Novelty Co. v. Holt, 85 Conn. 140, 81 At. 1061 (1912).
101. U.T.R.A. § 16 (4), N. Y. Pmzs. PROP. L.w (1934) § 56 (4).
102. U.T..RA. § 6 (3) (c), N. Y. Pr.s. PRop. LAw (1934) § 56 (3) (c).
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nothing further remains to be considered. But such is not the case for
the reason that the Act contaifis some important provisions affecting
transactions which may, or may not, involve the purchase-money finan-
cin'g of goods in the course of trade from producer to wholesaler to re-
tailer.10 3  Even though such transactions are not trust receipt transac-
tions,' a part of th6 law g6verning them is to be found in the Uriiform
Trust- Receipts, Act. These are attempted pledges or agreements to
pledge'not accorihpanied by possession in the pledgee. An instance of
an! iicomplete pledge which seems to be within the policy, of the statute
ia' now be given:
-Ooods ire delivered by a seller 'to a buyer on ten days credit. The
b uy-er then 'agrees to pledge the goods to a bank in return for a loan
of, Tohey with which* he intends to pay the seller. If he signs a trust
rceipt then it' will be a trust rec6ipt transaction provided he is left in
pogsession' for the proper purposes. 0 4 But suppose there:is merely a
Ortbal' agreemert' to pledge, oi suppose that possession is not left with
th6,pledgor for any of the delimited purposes. Under either supposition,
thgre Would not' be a trust receipt transaction but only an: incomplete
pledge. 05 - At common law 'the transaction would be invalid as against
putdhasers in good faith and for value from the pledgor in lossession.100
Yet' this iransaction is so like a regular trust receipt t'ranaction that it
isnkt surprising to find it provided for in the Act as will, shortly appear.
Ohithe other hand, it is submitted that the following instance would not
be within the policy of the statute:
- Mi:Micawber agrees to pledge his car to William 'Lender in return
f t"awoan. It is agreed verbally or in writing that the car is pledged td
L'endet, 'that Lender may take pdssession at any time he deems himself
ifiscure and that Micawber will not sell or encumber the dar without
tfi' -etpress permission of Lender. Reasons have already bden given
v 'fthis 'is not a trust receipt transaction,' ° Inasmuch' as the parties
ri,1b3;s'One case' which' did not involve purchase-money financing but which is a trust
receipt, transaction under the Act has been. suggested at p. 247, supra. Another case which
might possibly be considered to be within the Act, although doubtfully so, is discussed
at p. 252, supra.
104. That is, a third person delivers goods to the trustee in which, for new value, the
entruster by the transaction acquires a security interest. , See p. 247, supra. See heading
Security Interest Acquired by the Transaction, p. 247, supra. For the proper purposes see
note', sup . T
-fl0M. By definition a trust receipt transaction requires a writing [note 22, supra) end
possession must be left with the tiustee for one of the delimited purposes [note 7, supra].
-106 "Transfer of possession to the pledgee is necessary to create a valid pledge and the
pdsgessibn must be actual, 'not merely constructive, unless from the nature of the case the
property is not susceptible of manual delivery and possession." Titusville Iron Co. v. City
of New York, 207 N. Y. 203, 211, 100 N. E. 806, 809 (1912).
107. P. 244, sura.
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do not agree that Lender is to have the title it would seem that they have
attempted to create a pledge. Now let it be assumed that within ten
days after this agreement is made an attaching creditor without notice
levies upon the car. The creditor's attorney might be more than a little
surprised to learn that the common law relating to an attempted pledge,
without transfer of possession to the pledgee, has been modified by the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act. What, he might inquire, has this to do
with trust receipts? It has nothing to do with the purchase-money
financing of goods in the course of trade; the parties did not even con-
template a trust receipt transaction; nevertheless the writer is driven to
the conclusion that such a case is within the unlimited provisions of the
Act now to be summarized. 08
Provisions of the Act
A pledgee who gives new value in return for the pledge can defend his
lien against creditors, either with or without notice, for a period of ten
days from the time the new value is given, even though the pledgor
remains in possession.109 In both of the cases just suggested, therefore,
the pledgee is protected against attaching creditors for that brief period.
If the pledge, however, is given as security for an antecedent debt or obli-
gation owed by the pledgor to the pledgee, and in the case of new value
given by the pledgee after the ten day period has expired, the pledgee
must take possession in order to protect his lien from creditors without
notice.1 0  In any case, however, purchasers from the pledgor, who are
without notice, take free of the pledgee's lien during or after the ten
day period, unless prior to the purchase the pledgee has perfected the
pledge by taking possession.?"
The final provision to be considered is that relating to a redelivery
of possession by a pledgee to the pledgor before the pledge has been
redeemed. If a person holding "a pledgee's or other security interest"
in goods, by an agreement not amounting to a trust receipt transaction,
108. Prof. Bogert in his discussion of the Act suggests that Section 15 may poazibly qualify
the pledge provisions. Bogert, supra note 4, at 37. The writer agrees with him that this
is doubtful. The applicable part of the section is quoted note 46, supra.
109. U.T.R.A. § 3 (1) (a), N. Y. PERs. Pnor. LAw (1934) § 53 (1) (a).
110. U.T.RA. § 3 (1) (b), N. Y. Pams. Prop. LAw (1934) § 53 (1) (b). Pozes:aion is
defined to include such constructive possession as placing tags upon the goods or the posting
of signs in conspicuous places so as to indicate to third persons that the "entruster" has an
interest in the goods. U.T.R.A. § 1, N. Y. Pans. Pnop. LAw (1934) § 51 (9). But an
"entruster" is defined in the same section as a person who has or takes a security interest
under a trust receipt transaction. These pledges are not trust receipt transactions, hence,
query: Can the pledgee take such constructive possesion? Probably.
111. U.T.R.A. § 3 (2), N. Y. PaRs. Paop. LAw (1934) § 51 (2). By definition




delivers possession for a temporary and limited purpose to the one hold-
ing the title or beneficial interest the security holder is again protected
against attaching creditors for the brief period of ten days.112 The
pledgee's surrender of possession for the purpose of enabling the pledgor
to make a sale, or procure repairs may be given as examples.
It will be noticed that the italicized words quoted from the Act in
the preceding paragraph include a chattel mortgagee. If a chattel
mortgagee has neither filed under the chattel mortgage recording act
nor taken possession he is protected against attaching creditors without
notice for a period of ten days should he redeliyer the goods to the
mortgagor for a temporary and limited purpose. This part of the Act,
therefore, has an important effect both upon the common law of pledges
and upon unfiled chattel mortgages.
Conclusion
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act is a very complicated statute. The
Commissioners who drafted it had to consider and make just provision
not only for the immediate parties, but also for third persons in all cate-
gories who subsequently become concerned with the transaction. Com-
plexity could not be avoided. But most of the doubts, most of the purely
formal technicalities and most of the inconsistencies that existed in the
case-law have been swept away. If the injunction of the legislature, to
so interpret and construe the Act as to effectuate its general purpose
"to make uniform the law of the states" is obeyed, as it will be, the
adoption of the Act will represent a distinct gain to the business com-
munity." 3
The Act recognizes the trust receipt transaction as an independent form
of security transaction separate and apart from the familiar pledge,
chattel mortgage and conditional sale.
It gives to the entruster who finances the purchase of goods in the
course of trade from producer to retailer adequate protection against
insolvency of the trustee, while at the same time, it throws upon the
entruster the risk of dishonest dealing by his borrower.
It gives to pledgees and mortgagees, whose business it is to investigate,
a better chance to ascertain the true situation than they had at common
law without burdening the entruster with expensive filing.
It gives to good faith purchasers for new value who rely upon the
112. U.T.RA. § 3 (3), N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAWv (1934) § 53 (3). Compare as to the
common law rule Helburn-Thompson Co. v. All Americas Merc. Corp., 180 App. Div, 167,
167 N. Y. Supp. 711 (1st Dep't 1917), aff'd, 223 N. Y. 675, 119 N. E. 1048 (1918) and
Kellogg v. Thompson, 142 Mass. 76, 6 N. E. 860 (1886). See N. Y. LIEN LAW (1909) §
184 with respect to the garage keeper's lien, and In re Carter, 21 F. (2d) 587 (W. D. N.
Y. 1927).
113. U.T.R.A. § 18, N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58-j.
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trustee's possession greater protection in some cases than they had at
common law without lessening that protection in any case.
In its proper field it should facilitate and make more safe the trade
in goods, to the general benefit of the business community and of the
public.
